Savage:
The State Department's role, as you know, is not to solve the problems of cybersecurity. Its role is to represent the interests of the United States abroad, through its embassies and by working with international bodies. In particular, it works with other agencies of the federal government and the cybersecurity coordinator's office to formulate policy. This process has been underway for some time, but it picked up steam in 2009.
McGraw: What do you think about the technical background knowledge that policymakers bring to this question? Do they seem to understand what it is they're supposed to set policy about, or is it some sort of magic to them?
Savage: It's not magic. The people I dealt with in the cyber affairs office are very intelligent people who are quick studies and have been able to come to grips with cybersecurity issues from a sufficient depth of knowledge. Admittedly, the policy issues that they've addressed so far have not been profound, such as the BGP [Border Gateway Protocol] McGraw: You know, of course, some people want to push attribution so far as to completely get rid of the possibility of anonymity.
We have to keep that in mind as well.
Savage: It's never gonna happen. The public would object to that. tends to bring the best and brightest minds to play in that task. They work hard at it. They're proactive. And if you're proactive, you're going to get access to the best minds to confront a brand-new challenge. You're going to prepare for the possibility of attack, and you certainly also are going to prepare for defense.
McGraw: I've seen much more preparing for offense than defense, just from my own chair, in my discussions with the guys who are running these things, and that worries me, because I agree that you need to focus on both.
Savage: Let me say this, if they're doing superbly in defense, they won't tell you. If they understand how to defend against intrusions, they won't tell you. They'll keep it a secret.
McGraw: I'm not thinking about operational defense of the sort that we over-focus on. I think policymakers are paying a lot of attention to reactive threat-reduction centers and certs and the things that you talk about in some of your writings, rather than building things properly and security engineering, and I think that that's a rather fundamental mistake.
Savage: It is, and it's partially because they don't understand the technology or what options exist at the technology level. Thus, the conversation is reduced to lecturing to the public on the need to follow best practices and keep software up to date.
McGraw: Which is a little hard to do.
Right. But what's missing in this picture is that we as users of software systems cannot repair them. We can't even tell if they're broken. We can't tell if they've been penetrated, so who should be responsible? It seems to me it has to be the people who sell us these products. But, unfortunately, the common practice, as we both know, is that when you acquire a piece of software or hardware, you sign a license that says the vendor is not responsible for any of it, and that has to change. Not overnight, but it has to change.
McGraw: Let's assume that Stuxnet was a product of a nation-state. It's a pretty big assumption, but let's just assume it was. Do you think that the use of such a cyber weapon is morally justified?
Savage: Yes, I do. It's as morally justified as an attempt to sabotage a piece of physical equipment.
McGraw: What implications does nanotechnology, especially computational nanotechnology, have for cybersecurity?
Savage: On the surface, I would say none, except for the fact that as we make our components smaller, we put more components on a chip, which gives us some scope to change the way in which we write code and implement chips. For example, in the past, field-programmable gate arrays would have been seen as very expensive, so vendors wouldn't use them. They would use ASICs [application-specific integrated circuits] or do their own design using CAD tools. In the future, they'll have more real estate available, and as they do, I think, for security reasons, they should start changing the way in which they write code. They should put some monitoring on their chips so that they can find intrusions and identify unusual activity. Today, we incorporate drivers into our operating systems, so a company like Microsoft will produce an operating system and run a whole battery of tests to make sure that it has no bufferoverflow attacks, heap-overflow attacks, or other things through managed memory. I have a son who works at Microsoft, and he tells me that he's able to not only write code much faster, but it's much more secure. As we know from published reports, the number of major updates that Microsoft has had to do has gone down relative to its competition.
McGraw: I agree with you that Microsoft has made some progress, but do you think some of that will find its way into hardware?
Savage: Well, it could, but it still incorporates drivers developed by others. Why? For efficiency reasons. These drivers can be put in a user space, so why aren't they? [Microsoft] has implemented address space layout randomization and data execution protection. Those are important steps, but they can be subverted, as we know.
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McGraw: Yes, and sometimes they get skipped in various applications, which was a subject of a conversation I had with Ivan Arce in an earlier episode.
Savage: Yes, I recall reading that. So fix the code. Rewrite the code. My point is, as we both know, security is not free. Coming back to the nano point: because you have more components in a chip, you have more latitude to exploit a variety of techniques to make software and systems more robust.
McGraw: I think it's kind of ironic that we spend a lot of effort to come up with a universal computational device, a universal Turing machine, so to speak, and then we get all upset when it does some of the things that of course it is allowed to do by theory. Why don't we just have special-purpose machines that can't do everything? That would seem to help from a security perspective. eventually extend cryptography to computation. The reason it doesn't normally extend is because it's difficult to do both addition and multiplication on encrypted data. In other words, provide a way to encrypt so that when you do either addition or multiplication-think of addition as "or" and think of multiplication as "and"-you can produce an output that can be put back into the same code that was used to encode the data before you did the operations. 
